Overview

The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN — Ракетные войска стратегического назначения) is the branch of the Russian Armed Forces responsible for operating land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The RVSN forms a critical component of Russia's strategic nuclear triad, providing assured second-strike capability and strategic deterrence. The force evolved from Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces established as an independent service in 1959.

Historical Context

Soviet era (1959-1991): The Strategic Rocket Forces were created as a separate service branch under the Soviet Ministry of Defense, reflecting the central importance of nuclear deterrence in Soviet military doctrine. At peak strength in the 1980s, Soviet RVSN operated over 1,400 ICBMs in various configurations.

Post-Soviet transition (1991-2000): Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian RVSN inherited the majority of Soviet strategic forces. The force underwent significant reduction through arms control treaties (START I, START II negotiations) and economic constraints.

Modern period (2000-present): Modernization programs introduced new missile systems (Topol-M, RS-24 Yars, RS-28 Sarmat) while retiring Soviet-era weapons. The force structure emphasizes mobile systems and penetration aids against missile defense.

Organizational Structure

The RVSN is organized into missile armies (typically 3-4 active), each containing multiple missile divisions. A typical missile division includes:

  • Command element: Strategic planning and coordination
  • Missile regiments: Operational units with launchers and supporting infrastructure
  • Technical support units: Maintenance, logistics, security
  • Strategic communications: Connectivity to national command authority

Each regiment operates a specific missile type in either silo-based or mobile configuration.

Mission and Doctrine

The Strategic Rocket Forces' primary mission is nuclear deterrence through:

  • Assured retaliation capability: Survivable forces able to respond to first strike
  • Strategic stability: Maintaining credible deterrent against adversaries
  • National command authority support: Providing strategic strike options to Russian leadership

Doctrine emphasizes:

  • Maintaining forces in high readiness
  • Mobility and dispersal for survivability
  • Penetration of missile defense systems
  • Command and control survivability

Current ICBM Systems

RS-24 Yars (SS-29): Modern mobile ICBM with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Deployed on MZKT-7922 transporter-erector-launcher vehicles. Primary strategic system in current force structure.

RS-28 Sarmat (SS-X-30): Heavy liquid-fuel ICBM under deployment, intended to replace R-36M2 Voyevoda. Silo-based with high payload capacity.

RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27): Single-warhead ICBM in both mobile and silo variants. Continues in service alongside Yars.

RS-26 Rubezh: Intermediate-range system, deployment status variable based on arms control considerations.

Legacy systems being retired include UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19) and R-36M2 (SS-18), though some remain operational pending full replacement.

Basing Modes

Silo-based missiles: Deployed in hardened underground silos providing protection against all but direct nuclear strikes. Fixed location but heavily protected with redundant systems.

Mobile missiles: Mounted on wheeled transporter-erector-launcher vehicles, operating from hardened bases with ability to disperse to field locations. Survivability through mobility and concealment.

Road-mobile systems patrol designated operating areas, making targeting extremely difficult for adversaries. The mobile force represents the most survivable component of Russian strategic forces.

Command and Control

RVSN operates under direct control of Russian national command authority through:

  • Early warning systems: Radar and satellite detection of missile launches
  • Strategic command posts: Hardened facilities ensuring command continuity
  • Communications networks: Redundant systems including hardened cables, radio, and satellite links
  • Automated systems: Decision support and launch authorization procedures

The system is designed to maintain operational capability through nuclear attack, ensuring retaliation capacity survives first strike.

Personnel and Training

The RVSN comprises approximately 50,000 personnel (estimates vary), including:

  • Launch crews: Highly trained officers responsible for missile operations
  • Technical personnel: Specialists in missile maintenance and support systems
  • Security forces: Protection of strategic assets and installations
  • Command and administrative staff: Planning, logistics, and coordination

Training emphasizes reliability, security, and operational discipline. Launch crews undergo rigorous selection and continuous evaluation.

Arms Control Context

The RVSN force structure is shaped by arms control agreements including:

  • New START Treaty (2010): Limits deployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles
  • INF Treaty (1987-2019): Previously restricted intermediate-range systems
  • Historical treaties: START I, START II influenced force evolution

Current modernization occurs within New START limitations while maintaining strategic capability equivalent to potential adversaries.

Strategic Significance

The Strategic Rocket Forces provide Russia's most credible strategic deterrent due to:

  • Immediate readiness: Launch-on-warning capability with forces on continuous alert
  • Penetration capability: Modern systems designed to defeat missile defense
  • Survivability: Mobile systems and hardened silos ensure retaliation capacity
  • Capacity: Sufficient warheads to hold at risk adversary strategic targets

This capability underpins Russian strategic autonomy and influences global strategic balance.

Related Equipment and Systems

This reference page provides educational overview of strategic forces for research purposes. Information is derived from openly available sources. No classified information is included. Strategic forces serve deterrence purposes under international law and arms control frameworks.