Strategic Rocket Forces Overview
Introduction
The Strategic Rocket Forces (Ракетные войска стратегического назначения, RVSN) formed the cornerstone of Soviet and Russian nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War and into modern times. As an independent branch of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces controlled land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) representing the most powerful component of Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear triad.
This documentation provides comprehensive overview of Strategic Rocket Forces organization, equipment, deployment patterns, and evolution from formation through modern restructuring.
Historical significance
Soviet innovation: USSR pioneered large-scale deployment of land-based strategic missiles creating entirely new military branch.
Nuclear deterrence: Strategic Rocket Forces maintained primary Soviet strategic deterrent during Cold War competition.
Independent service: Unique among world militaries in establishing ICBMs as separate armed forces branch rather than subordinate command.
Modern transition: Post-Soviet reorganization transforming Strategic Rocket Forces while maintaining nuclear mission continuity.
Formation and early history
Origins
1959 establishment: Strategic Rocket Forces officially formed December 17, 1959, consolidating missile units under unified command.
Marshal Nedelin: First commander Marshal Mitrofan Nedelin directing initial organization until death in 1960 Nedelin catastrophe.
Missile development: Formation coincided with successful Soviet ICBM development demonstrating intercontinental strike capability.
Strategic priority: Khrushchev era emphasis on missiles over bombers elevating Strategic Rocket Forces to premier service status.
Organizational development
Command structure: Establishment of dedicated command hierarchy separate from artillery forces managing earlier tactical rockets.
Training infrastructure: Creation of specialized training institutions developing missile operations expertise.
Deployment expansion: Rapid expansion deploying first-generation ICBMs across Soviet territory establishing global strike capability.
Technical evolution: Continuous technological advancement improving accuracy, survivability, and penetration capability.
Organization structure
Command hierarchy
Main Staff: Central command managing all Strategic Rocket Forces operations from Moscow headquarters.
Missile armies: Multiple numbered missile armies each controlling several missile divisions in geographic regions.
Missile divisions: Division-level formations operating specific ICBM types from fixed silos or mobile platforms.
Regiments and battalions: Lower-echelon units manning individual missile installations and support facilities.
Strategic command
General Staff coordination: Integration with General Staff ensuring strategic employment aligning with national military strategy.
Nuclear planning: Participation in strategic nuclear planning coordinating with Navy strategic submarines and Long-Range Aviation bombers.
Political oversight: Strict political control mechanisms ensuring civilian authority over nuclear weapons employment.
Communications networks: Dedicated strategic communications providing positive control and launch authorization systems.
Support infrastructure
Maintenance facilities: Specialized facilities supporting missile maintenance, assembly, and technical servicing.
Test ranges: Dedicated test facilities at Plesetsk, Baikonur, and other locations supporting development and operational training.
Early warning integration: Close coordination with early warning radar and satellite systems providing attack assessment.
Security forces: Dedicated security units protecting strategic installations from external and internal threats.
ICBM systems
First generation
R-7 Semyorka: First operational ICBM achieving intercontinental range but requiring fixed launch sites with extensive infrastructure.
R-16: Second-generation ICBM featuring storable propellants enabling rapid launch readiness and simplified operations.
R-9: Contemporary of R-16 using cryogenic propellants providing better performance with operational complexity.
Operational challenges: Early systems required extensive preparation and vulnerable fixed installations limiting survivability.
Second generation
UR-100 (SS-11 Sego): Mass-produced light ICBM deployed in hardened silos forming backbone of Strategic Rocket Forces during 1960s-1970s.
R-36 (SS-9 Scarp): Heavy ICBM carrying large warheads or early MIRV configurations targeting hardened American installations.
RT-2 (SS-13 Savage): Solid-fuel ICBM providing improved readiness and survivability through solid propellant technology.
MIRVed systems: Introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles multiplying strike capability without increasing launcher numbers.
Modern systems
UR-100N UTTKh (SS-19 Stiletto): Advanced liquid-fuel ICBM with MIRV capability forming major component of 1980s-1990s forces.
R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Satan): Heaviest ICBM deployed carrying up to 10 MIRVs with exceptional throw-weight capability.
RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 Sickle): Road-mobile solid-fuel ICBM enhancing survivability through mobility and concealment.
RS-24 Yars: Modern MIRVed solid-fuel system replacing older ICBMs with improved penetration aids and accuracy.
RS-28 Sarmat: Next-generation heavy ICBM entering service replacing R-36M2 with advanced capabilities.
Deployment patterns
Silo basing
Hardened installations: ICBMs deployed in heavily reinforced underground silos designed to withstand near-miss nuclear explosions.
Geographic distribution: Silos distributed across Soviet/Russian territory complicating enemy targeting and attack planning.
Launch control facilities: Underground command posts controlling multiple silos through hardened communications links.
Vulnerability concerns: Fixed silos increasingly vulnerable to accurate counterforce strikes driving mobile deployment.
Mobile systems
Road-mobile launchers: Transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) carrying missiles on wheeled vehicles enabling dispersal from garrisons.
Rail-mobile systems: RT-23 Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel) deployed on rail cars providing mobility using existing railroad infrastructure.
Patrol areas: Mobile systems dispersed into vast forest patrol areas making detection and targeting extremely difficult.
Survivability advantage: Mobility providing significant survivability advantage over fixed silos against counterforce attacks.
Operational posture
Day-to-day alert: Portion of force maintained on alert status ready for rapid launch on tactical warning or orders.
Generated alert: Capability to generate higher alert levels dispersing mobile forces and preparing reserve systems.
Launch procedures: Strict positive control requiring proper authorization codes before weapon release.
Fail-safe mechanisms: Multiple safety interlocks preventing unauthorized or accidental launch.
Strategic doctrine
Nuclear deterrence
Assured retaliation: Strategic Rocket Forces sized and postured to ensure devastating retaliation surviving any first strike.
Launch postures: Options included launch on warning, launch under attack, and delayed second strike after riding out attack.
Targeting philosophy: Countervalue targeting of cities and industrial centers plus counterforce targeting of enemy nuclear forces.
Strategic stability: Force sizing and survivability designed to maintain stable mutual deterrence discouraging first strikes.
Arms control
SALT limitations: Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties imposing numerical limits on ICBM launchers and warheads.
START reductions: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties requiring substantial reductions from Cold War peak force levels.
New START: Current treaty limiting deployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles with verification provisions.
Compliance mechanisms: Extensive verification including on-site inspections and data exchanges ensuring treaty compliance.
Modernization priorities
Accuracy improvements: Continuous enhancements to guidance systems improving circular error probable (CEP).
Penetration aids: Development of decoys, chaff, and maneuvering warheads countering ballistic missile defenses.
Survivability measures: Hardening, mobility, and rapid-launch capability maintaining credible retaliatory capability.
Command and control: Improving strategic communications ensuring connectivity under nuclear attack conditions.
Training and readiness
Personnel selection
Rigorous screening: Extensive background checks and psychological evaluation for personnel handling nuclear weapons.
Educational requirements: High technical education standards recruiting officers with engineering and physics backgrounds.
Political reliability: Emphasis on political loyalty ensuring trustworthiness with strategic nuclear systems.
Career specialization: Dedicated career tracks developing expertise in specific ICBM systems and support specialties.
Operational training
Simulation systems: Extensive use of simulators replicating launch control procedures without actual missile firings.
Alert exercises: Regular exercises testing alert generation, dispersal, and simulated launch procedures.
Test launches: Limited operational test launches from Plesetsk demonstrating system reliability and crew proficiency.
Safety emphasis: Extensive safety training preventing accidents with nuclear materials and propellants.
Maintenance standards
Scheduled maintenance: Strict adherence to maintenance schedules ensuring system reliability and readiness.
Technical inspections: Regular inspections verifying missile condition and correcting deficiencies before operational issues develop.
Propellant handling: Specialized training for hazardous propellant loading and servicing operations.
Quality control: Multi-level quality assurance preventing errors that could compromise safety or reliability.
Post-Soviet transformation
Force reduction
START implementation: Dramatic reductions from Cold War peak of over 1,400 ICBMs to New START limits around 400 deployed launchers.
System retirement: Retirement of older systems including all silo-based SS-18s, rail-mobile SS-24s, and first-generation mobile systems.
Consolidation: Reduction in number of missile divisions and armies consolidating remaining forces.
Infrastructure disposal: Environmental remediation and infrastructure elimination at deactivated missile bases.
Modernization program
New systems: Introduction of RS-24 Yars, development of RS-28 Sarmat, and continued RS-12M Topol-M deployment.
Silo refurbishment: Modernization of remaining silo infrastructure supporting new missile systems.
Mobile expansion: Increasing proportion of mobile systems enhancing overall force survivability.
Command modernization: Upgrading strategic command and control systems incorporating digital technologies.
Organizational changes
2001 restructuring: Brief merger with Space Forces and Missile Defense forces creating Space Forces branch.
2011 reorganization: Recreation of Aerospace Defense Forces combining air defense and space surveillance missions.
2015 reform: Strategic Rocket Forces regaining independent status distinct from Aerospace Forces.
Current structure: Restored independent service focusing exclusively on land-based strategic missiles.
International comparisons
U.S. Minuteman III
Force size: American ICBM force significantly smaller with 400 Minuteman III missiles versus Russian ~400 mixed systems.
Basing mode: U.S. relying exclusively on silo basing while Russia employs substantial mobile component.
Modernization: U.S. Minuteman III dating to 1970s with life extension versus Russian deployment of new systems.
MIRV status: American ICBMs downloaded to single warheads under arms control versus Russian MIRVed systems.
Chinese DF series
Smaller force: Chinese ICBM force significantly smaller than Russian Strategic Rocket Forces.
Mixed basing: Chinese employing both silo and mobile systems similar to Russian approach.
Modernization pace: Rapid Chinese modernization expanding both numbers and capabilities.
Organizational model: Chinese Rocket Force organization influenced by Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces model.
Technical challenges
Aging infrastructure
Service life extension: Extending operational life of systems beyond original design service periods.
Component obsolescence: Replacing obsolete electronic components no longer in production.
Propellant degradation: Managing liquid and solid propellant aging requiring periodic replacement or refurbishment.
Environmental concerns: Addressing environmental contamination from propellant handling and storage.
Modern threats
Missile defense: Countering American and NATO ballistic missile defense systems with penetration aids and countermeasures.
Cyber threats: Protecting command and control systems from cyber intrusion and electronic warfare.
Precision threats: Hardening against increasingly accurate conventional and nuclear counterforce threats.
Early warning gaps: Maintaining effective early warning capabilities despite satellite and radar limitations.
Future developments
Sarmat deployment
RS-28 Sarmat: Heavy ICBM replacing R-36M2 with improved range, payload, and ability to attack via polar or southern trajectories.
Deployment schedule: Gradual replacement of remaining SS-18 systems with Sarmat beginning in 2020s.
Capability enhancements: Improved penetration aids, hypersonic glide vehicles, and fractional orbital bombardment potential.
Strategic implications: Maintaining Russian heavy ICBM capability as counterweight to American missile defenses.
Avangard hypersonic
Hypersonic glide vehicle: Avangard system featuring hypersonic maneuvering warhead carried by UR-100N UTTKh boosters.
Deployment status: Initial deployment beginning 2019 providing new penetration capability.
Defense countermeasure: Hypersonic maneuverability designed to defeat ballistic missile defense systems.
Future integration: Potential integration with RS-28 Sarmat providing advanced delivery platform.
Automation initiatives
Digital control: Replacing analog control systems with digital electronics improving reliability and capability.
Automated diagnostics: Implementing automated system health monitoring reducing maintenance requirements.
Network integration: Improving integration with broader strategic early warning and command networks.
AI applications: Exploring artificial intelligence applications for threat assessment and decision support.
Related resources
Equipment Guide (/guide/): Comprehensive documentation of Soviet and Russian military systems.
Legion Library (https://legion.wplus.net/): Main Legion equipment and systems documentation.
Infrastructure (https://wplus.net/infrastructure/): Hosting infrastructure and operations documentation.
Security Resources (https://wplus.net/security/): Security practices and technical hardening guides.
Strategic Rocket Forces documentation maintained for educational and historical reference purposes. Information derived from open sources including arms control data exchanges, technical publications, and historical archives.